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Professional paper
Engineers and scientists today bear the responsibility for the quality of life 
of future generations more than ever before. Engineering is an important 
and learned profession, which has a direct and vital impact on the quality of 
life for all people. The decisions and actions of engineers have a profound 
impact on the world we live in, and society at large. Accordingly, engineers 
must provide their services on the basis of honesty, impartiality, fairness, 
and equity, and must be dedicated to the protection of public health, safety, 
and welfare. Engineering failures are often found to stem from deficiencies 
in engineering ethics, and engineers are responsible for their actions to 
the engineering community, to political and societal institutions as well 
as to their employers, customers, and technology users. Unfortunately, 
we are frequently witnesses to more and more negative consequences of 
scientific and technological advances markedly caused by neglect of moral 
principles in human activities. Engineers have to be aware of ethics in 
decision-making during their professional practice and they should not 
think only about profit, because when things go wrong, there is always an 
ethical dimension. 
Nova razmišljanja o inženjerskoj etici
Strukovni članak
U današnje vrijeme inženjeri i znanstvenici nose teret odgovornosti za 
kvalitetu života budućih generacija više nego ikad prije. Inženjerstvo je 
važno i učeno zanimanje koje ima izravan i vitalan utjecaj na kvalitetu života 
svih ljudi. Odluke i aktivnosti inženjera imaju dalekosežan utjecaj na svijet 
u kojem živimo i na cjelokupno ljudsko društvo. Zbog toga, rad inženjera 
mora se temeljiti na ispravnosti, nepristranosti, pravednosti i poštenju, 
te mora biti usmjeren prema zaštiti javnog zdravlja, sigurnosti i opće 
dobrobiti. Pogreške u inženjerskom radu često su uzrokovane nedostatkom 
inženjerske etike. Inženjeri za svoj rad odgovaraju inženjerskoj zajednici, 
političkim i društvenim institucijama, kao i svojim poslodavcima, te 
kupcima, odnosno korisnicima inženjerskih proizvoda. Nažalost, često smo 
svjedoci sve negativnijih posljedica znanstvenog i tehnološkog napretka, 
uzrokovanih zanemarivanjem moralnih načela u ljudskom djelovanju. 
Inženjeri moraju biti svjesni etike u svom profesionalnom radu i ne smiju 
imati na umu samo profit, jer kad stvari krenu krivim putem, uvijek je u 
pitanju etička dimenzija.
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1.  Introduction
Ethics is the branch of philosophy dealing with values 
relating to human conduct, with respect to the rightness 
and wrongness of certain actions and to the integrity 
and falsity of the motives and intentions of such actions 
[1]. Thus, ethics is the study of moral characteristics, 
and involves the moral choices made by interacting 
individuals. The term ethics is derived from the Greek 
word “ethos”, meaning “custom”, “habit”, and “way of 
living”. Virtue, ethics and moral should be deeply rooted 
in the history, society and culture of human beings. In 
ancient China when moral values still prevailed, there 
was only one law for judging a person – virtue (de - in 
Chinese language). Ancient Chinese people stressed 
cultivation of one’s xinxing (a Chinese idiom for the 
mind or heart nature, moral character and ethics). A 
Chinese proverb says, “A man without any virtue is no 
more than a beast.” When a person does not have any 
virtue left, he is no longer considered worthy of being a 
human and should have no place in the human society. 
From this, one can see how highly virtue was regarded 
in ancient China. 
Engineering ethics, as the field of applied ethics, 
is the application of philosophical and moral systems 
to the proper judgment and behavior by engineers in 
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conducting their work, including the products and 
systems they design and the consulting services they 
provide. Thus, engineering ethics is defined as the rules 
and standards governing the conduct of engineers in their 
roles as professionals, and is concerned with determining 
the standards in engineering ethics and applying them 
to particular situations. Engineers need to be aware of 
ethics as they make choices during their professional 
practice of engineering. The decisions and actions of 
engineers have a profound impact on the world we live 
in, and society at large. Modern technology has profound 
impact on humankind and all life on Earth. Unfortunately 
we frequently are witnesses to many bad or even tragic 
consequences of scientific and technological advances 
markedly caused by neglecting moral principles in 
people’s activities.
In the West, practical and theoretical Greek thought 
has been the basis of all later systems. Socrates is a 
personalized version of that tradition, an ideal philosopher 
and sage. Plato combines the theory of virtue with the 
theory of the state. He has established a canon of four 
virtues: wisdom, courage, prudence and righteousness. 
Plato considered that good served by virtues is acquired by 
knowledge, and that evil is the consequence of ignorance 
about what is good. Aristotle made the distinction between 
theoretical and practical philosophy in which he included 
ethics. Aristotle was the first to define ethics as an 
autonomous discipline and separated it from mythology 
and other theoretical disciplines such as metaphysics, 
logic, physics and mathematics. Aristotle’s approach was 
to emphasize virtuous living. A good person will make 
good decisions, so what is important is to become a good 
person. The basis of morals and ethics in Christianity is 
the God’s Ten Commandments. The Ten Commandments 
are a list of religious and moral imperatives that, 
according to the Judeo-Christian tradition, were authored 
by God and given to Moses on Mount Sinai in the form 
of two stone tablets. Since ancient era all societies have 
their codes of ethics and regarded them as being of the 
utmost importance. 
Viewing ethics as core values of human life leaves 
us with many important questions. Real ethics or the 
values behind them cannot and should not change with 
time, although their expression or focus may change. But 
nowadays we can see that human morality has declined 
drastically and that the ethical standards in society are 
very low. Engineering really improves and enriches 
human life but also endangers it. We have to be aware of 
the fact that by using available engineering technologies 
it is possible to provide abundance for all human beings, 
but also to destroy all life on Earth. Therefore modern 
engineers have to study and apply ethical codes, doctrines 
and principles in their professional engineering practice. 
2. Using case studies in engineering ethics
Case studies (also called “case histories”) are 
descriptions of real situations that provide a context for 
engineers and others to explore problems. Case studies 
typically involve complex issues where there is often 
no single correct answer - engineers may be asked to 
select the “best” answer given the situation. A good case 
study, like a good story, should engage engineers’ interest 
and they should explore and find a case study they are 
interested in. 
Why use case studies? Case studies allow engineers 
to explore the nature of a problem and circumstances 
that affect a solution, to learn about others’ viewpoints 
and how they may be taken into account, to define their 
priorities and make their own decisions to solve the 
problem, and to predict outcomes and consequences.
2.1. Case 1: The Ford Pinto
In the late 1960’s, the Ford Motor Company designed 
a subcompact, the Pinto (Figure 1), weighing less than 
910 kg and selling for less than $2000 [2]. Anxious to 
compete with foreign-made subcompacts, Ford brought 
the car into production in a little more than two years, in 
1971. The regular time to produce an automobile is 43 
months, it took Ford 25. 
Figure 1. Ford Pinto [2]
Slika 1. Ford Pinto [2]
Given this shorter time-frame, styling preceded much 
of the engineering, thus restricting engineering design 
more than usual. As a result, it was decided that the best 
place for the fuel tank was between the rear axle and the 
bumper (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Ford Pinto - design defect of the fuel tank system (inside the ellipse) [2]
Slika 2. Ford Pinto - neispravna konstrukcija rezervoara goriva (unutar elipse) [2]
Before the production, however, Ford engineers 
discovered a major flaw in the car’s design. In nearly 
all rear-end crash test collisions (at the speed of over 48 
km/h) the Pinto’s fuel system would rupture extremely 
easily (Figure 3). The differential housing had exposed 
bolt heads that could puncture the gas tank if the tank 
were driven forward against them upon rear impact. Now 
all that is needed is a spark from a cigarette, ignition, 
or scraping metal, and both cars would be engulfed in 
flames. If a Pinto was struck from behind at higher speed 
of over 65 km/h, its doors would possibly jam shut and its 
trapped passengers inside would burn to death. Because 
the assembly-line machinery was already tooled when 
engineers found this defect, top Ford officials decided to 
manufacture the car anyway in 1971, even though Ford 
owned the patent on a much safer fuel tank. A confidential 
company memo directed that the safety features would 
not be adopted at that time until required by law.
Figure 3. Rear-end crash test collision of the Ford Pinto [2]
Slika 3. Test udara odostraga u Ford Pinto [2]
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The best method for improving the safety of the 
Pinto was to line the gas tank with a rubber bladder, to 
protect it from rupture. Ford alleged that it would cost 
$11 per car to add any sort of a fuel tank’s fire prevention 
device. A confidential cost-benefit analysis prepared by 
Ford (Figure 4) concluded that it was not cost-efficient 
to add an $11 per car cost in order to correct the flaws. 
Benefits derived from spending this amount of money 
were estimated to be $49,5 million. This estimation 
assumed that each death, which could be avoided, would 
be worth $200000, that each major burn injury, that 
could be avoided, would be worth $67000 and that an 
average repair costs $700 per car involved in a rear-end 
accident. It further assumed that there would be 2100 
burned vehicles, 180 serious burn injuries, and 180 burn 
deaths in making this calculation. When the unit cost was 
spread out over the number of cars and light trucks which 
would be affected by the design change, at a cost of $11 
per vehicle, the cost was calculated to be $137,5 million, 
much greater than the $49,5 million benefit.
Figure 4. Confidential internal Ford’s benefits & costs analysis
Slika 4. Povjerljiva Fordova interna analiza koristi i troškova 
Analyses showed later that the total purchase and 
installation cost of the bladder would have been $5,08 
per car. That $5,08 per car could have saved the lives 
of several hundred innocent people. Many such victims 
or their relatives filed civil suits against Ford Motor 
Company.
The Pinto disasters that were taking place did 
not go unnoticed by the government. The National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began 
investigating the case shortly after the Pintos started 
rolling off the assembly line. It wasn’t until May 1978 
that the Department of Transportation (a division of 
the NHTSA) announced that the Pinto fuel system had 
a “safety related defect” and demanded a recall. Ford 
agreed, and on June 9, 1978 the company recalled 1,5 
million Pintos. As deaths and injuries continued to occur, 
Ford stopped producing the Pinto after 1980, having sold 
about 3 million of the vehicles. By conservative estimates 
Pinto crashes have caused 500 burn deaths to people who 
would not have been seriously injured if the car had not 
burst into flames (Figure 5). The figure could be as high 
as 900.
    
Figure 5. Tragic consequences of design defect of the Ford 
Pinto gas tank [2]
Slika 5. Tragične posljedice neispravne konstrukcije 
rezervoara goriva Ford Pinta [2]
The Ford Pinto case is a classical ethics issue. If 
management of the Ford Motor Company really placed 
marketing considerations above safety, was that objective 
ethical and are members of management morally 
responsible for the preventable Pinto fire deaths? In Ford 
Pinto case, safety is obviously defined as acceptable risk. 
Although they had the foreknowledge of the hazardous 
flaw and anticipated the deaths of hundreds of innocent 
civilians, they still decided that it simply was not profitable 
to make the cars safer. This is a telling illustration of a 
corporation’s mindset; the ethics and public good is of 
little concern unless it coincides with profits. Whether or 
not the Ford Motor Company is in business to make a 
profit, it should not be in business to kill people.
It seems that profit is the only god on Earth. There 
is a common saying: “In God we trust”, which is the 
official U.S. national motto. But reality proved many 
times that: “In profit (i.e. in dollar) we trust”. The Ford 
Pinto case strongly indicates that a clear understanding 
and application of engineering ethics is of utmost 
importance.
Not only the management but also the engineers 
involved in the Pinto’s design, were very well aware 
of the design defect of the fuel tank system, but no one 
warned the public. Engineers gave in to pressure from 
superiors to keep quiet about the unsafe cars. But they 
are also morally responsible for the horrible deaths of 
so many innocent people. Obviously, loyalty to the Ford 
Motor Company was for them more important than ethics 
and moral obligations for the public good. Of course, 
they were also afraid of losing their jobs and careers, 
but when ethics issues are concerned, there should be 
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no prerequisites and no fear. People with high ethical 
standards always have in mind care for other people, 
society and environment. They do not put themselves 
in the first place. These are the differences between the 
ordinary man and the man of high ethical standard and 
conduct.
2.2. Case 2: The Space Shuttle Challenger 
On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed 
when the space shuttle they were aboard of, the Challenger, 
exploded just over a minute (73 seconds) into the flight 
(Figure 6). The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings 
to seat properly allowed hot combustion gases to leak 
from the side of the booster and burn through the external 
fuel tank. The failure of the O-ring was attributed to 
several factors, including a faulty design of the solid 
rocket boosters, insufficient low-temperature testing of 
the O-ring material and the joints that the O-ring sealed, 
and a lack of proper communication between different 
levels of NASA management.
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster was a 
preventable tragedy and NASA tried to cover it up by 
calling it a mysterious accident. However, one man had 
the courage to bring the real true story to the eyes of 
the public and it is to Roger Boisjoly to whom we are 
thankful. Many lessons can be learned from this disaster 
to help prevent further disasters and to improve on 
engineering ethics.
Roger Boisjoly [3], the chief O-ring engineer, 
who worked for Morton Thiokol, the company which 
manufactured the booster rockets, knew the problems 
with the O-ring all too well (Figure 7). More than a year 
Figure 6. Launch (left) and explosion (right) of the Space Shuttle Challenger [3]
Slika 6. Lansiranje (lijevo) i eksplozija (desno) Space Shuttle Challengera [3]
earlier he attempted to warn the panel of vice presidents 
of the inherent dangers involved in the launch. But 
despite his warnings and anxiety of some others Thiokol 
engineers and managers, Challenger was launched. The 
question was: Why, on the eve of the Challenger launch, 
did NASA managers decide that launching the mission 
in such low temperatures was an acceptable risk, despite 
the concerns of their engineers regarding problems 
with the O-ring? Possible answers could be: urgency 
due to the competition with Russians to be the first to 
observe Halley’s Comet or some kind of political and/
or economical pressure from the USA government or 
Congress. 
Roger Boisjoly, the Thiokol engineer, testified before 
the Congress and sued the Morton Thiokol Company 
under a federal whistleblowing statute, but he lost. 
Thiokol gave up on a ten million dollar incentive fee, but 
did not sign a document admitting to legal liability. After 
all the testimonials Biosjoly was taken off the project 
and subtly harassed by the Thiokol management. He left 
the company and underwent therapy for a post-traumatic 
stress disorder. For his honesty and integrity leading 
up to and directly following the shuttle disaster, Roger 
Boisjoly was awarded the Prize for Scientific Freedom 
and Responsibility by the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science. Roger Boisjoly now lectures 
on changing workplace ethics issues, a subject on which 
he has also spoken at MIT. Boisjoly said that this fatal 
accident could have been prevented. “The answer 
to preventing future catastrophes,” he said, “lies in 
engineering ethics”. The Challenger case is an excellent 
example showing that ethical issues involve confronting 
engineering responsibility against management decision-
making.
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Figure 7. Design of the field joint with rubber O-rings [3]
Slika 7. Konstrukcija spojne plohe s gumenim O-prstenovima 
[3]
2.3. Case 3: The Space Shuttle Columbia
On January 16, 2003, Space Shuttle Columbia takes 
off on what will be its last mission. NASA engineer 
Rodney Rocha and others worried that a piece of foam 
that tore from the shuttle’s external propellant tank and 
struck the left wing 81 seconds after lift-off could have 
damaged the craft, making it vulnerable to the high heat 
generated during reentry (Figure 8). But Rocha’s superiors 
refused his request to try to confirm possible damage and 
that chance was tragically missed. While Columbia was 
still in orbit Rodney Rocha, who foresaw the accident, 
desperately tried to sound the alarm about Columbia’s 
potentially damaged condition. But he was ignored by 
NASA managers, which under pressure to meet launch 
schedules and cut costs, limited the investigation on the 
grounds stated that little could be done even if problems 
were found. Even while the damaged Columbia was 
still in orbit, there was a chance the crew could have 
been rescued by another shuttle if only the true state 
of Columbia’s condition had been known. On February 
1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia, on its way to its 
landing site in Florida, blew apart in the skies of East 
Texas. Its seven-member crew perished. The $2 billion 
ship was lost; some destruction occurred on the ground, 
and considerable cost was incurred to recover debris 
scattered over several states. The Space Shuttle program 
was set back over two years by the disaster, a delay 
comparable only to that resulting from the Challenger 
disaster.
The loss of Columbia was a result of damage sustained 
during launch when a piece of foam insulation the size 
of a small briefcase broke off the Space Shuttle external 
tank (the main propellant tank) under the aerodynamic 
forces of launch. The debris struck the leading edge of 
the left wing, damaging the Shuttle’s thermal protection 
system, which protects it from heat generated with the 
atmosphere during re-entry. As demonstrated by ground 
experiments conducted by the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board, this likely created a 15 to 25 cm 
diameter hole, allowing hot gases to enter the left wing 
when Columbia later reentered the atmosphere and 
causing the disintegration of the left wing and then the 
Shuttle, just as Rodney Rocha predicted.
In both Space Shuttle cases individual engineers 
played significant similar ethical roles trying to prevent 
the accidents (Roger Boisjoly in the case of Challenger, 
Rodney Rocha in the case of Columbia), but without 
success, because unfortunately profit is usually above the 
concern for the human life and public good [4].
2.4. Case 4: McDonnell Douglas DC-10 plane
On June 12, 1972 American Airlines Flight 96 DC-
10 left Detroit with 67 passengers. After reaching 3658 
meters over town of Windsor in Canada, Ontario province, 
the bulk aft cargo door blew off, collapsing the floor and 
disrupting all hydraulic controls to tail section (Figure 9). 
Fortunately the pilot, Captain McCormick, had trained 
on a simulator how to handle loss of control over the rear 
engine and wings, and he was able to land the plane safely 
in Detroit. It was now clear that there was a problem. The 
problem was first recognized in August 1969. The same 
thing had also happened in a ground test in 1970. 
There were several errors in the design of the fuselage 
for this plane: the bulk aft cargo door had to be secured 
from the outside, and there was no way for those inside the 
plane to check that this had been done correctly. If it was 
not done correctly, the door could blow out during flight. 
Once this happened, the cargo hold would depressurize. 
The passenger compartment would remain pressurized, 
so there would be an immense differential pressure on 
the passenger floor. The floor would collapse, rupturing 
the hydraulic control lines to the rear engine and control 
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surfaces on the rear wings. The plane would then most 
probably crash. 
Figure 8. The Space Shuttle Columbia’s last launch (arrow 
points the cause of damage of the left wing) [4]
Slika 8. Posljednje lansiranje Space Shuttle Columbije 
(strelica pokazuje uzrok oštećenja lijevoga krila) [4]
Figure 9. Position of the DC-10 plane’s bulk aft cargo door 
that failed [5]
Slika 9. Pozicija stražnjih vrata za teret avionu DC-10 koja su 
zakazala [5]
Daniel Applegate, the director of project engineering 
at Convair, the company that designed the fuselage, wrote 
a memo to his supervisors detailing potential problems of 
cargo door, saying ”It seems to me inevitable that, in the 
twenty years ahead of us, DC-10 cargo doors will come 
open, and I expect this to usually result in the loss of the 
plane.” 
After the Detroit near-disaster, NTSB (National 
Transportation Safety Board) investigation revealed 
several problems and recommended immediate design 
changes. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) did 
not follow NTSB recommendations. FAA director John 
Shaffer and McDonnell Douglas President Jackson 
McGowan reached a gentleman’s agreement to voluntarily 
fix the problem, but no further official action was taken. 
In July 1972, three inspectors at Long Beach plant 
certified that DC-10 plane no. 29 (Ship 29) had been 
modified to fix problems. Each affixed a stamp to the 
Ship’s paperwork confirming the modifications. The 
modifications, in fact, had not been made.  
The only change made to the aircraft was to install a 
one inch peephole overlooking the locking pins. It would 
have been possible to provide further protection, by, for 
example, installing vents between the cargo hold and the 
passenger compartment so that the pressure differential 
would equalize before crushing the floor, but this would 
have involved major design changes. 
On March 3, 1974, Turkish Airlines DC-10 (just the 
one previously mentioned as plane no. 29, i.e. Ship 29) 
took off from Paris. At the height of 3658 meters the bulk 
aft cargo door blew out and all 346 people on board were 
killed, including 12 crew members.
In Aircraft Accident Report [5] it is stated that 
the accident of the Turkish Airlines DC-10 was the 
result of the ejection in flight of the aft cargo door 
on the left-hand side (Figure 9 and 10). The sudden 
depressurization which followed led to the disruption of 
the floor structure, causing six passengers and parts of the 
aircraft to be ejected, rendering no. 2 engine inoperative 
and impairing the flight controls (tail surfaces) so that 
it was impossible for the crew to regain control of the 
aircraft. The underlying factor in the sequence of events 
leading to the accident was the incorrect engagement of 
the door latching mechanism before take-off due to the 
characteristics of the design of the mechanism and the 
absence of any visual inspection, through the viewport 
to verify that the lock pins were effectively engaged. It 
should be noted, however that a view port was provided so 
that there could be a visual check of the engagement of the 
lock pins, although at the time of the accident inspection 
was rendered difficult by the inadequate diameter of the 
view port. Finally in the report it is concluded that all 
these risks had already become evident earlier, at the 
time of the Windsor accident (on June 12, 1972), but no 
efficacious corrective action had followed.
The question is why the needed changes to ensure 
safety were not made earlier. McDonnell Douglas, 
the manufacturer of the aircraft, was in a time-critical 
situation: they needed to get the DC-10 onto the market 
before its rival, the Lockheed Tri-Star. Convair, the 
engineering company that McDonnell Douglas had 
subcontracted to do the fuselage design, was unwilling 
to argue too strongly that the problem needed to be fixed, 
since they would almost certainly be held to blame for 
the existence of the problem - and could expect to be 
stuck with the million-dollar costs of the design changes, 
such as: fitting a support plate on the door, installing a 
big enough window in the door so that a ground-crew 
member could clearly tell if the latch hooks were properly 
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engaged and posting locking instructions clearly in 
English. Tragically, as French investigators discovered, 
the ground crewman who sealed the door on the Turkish 
Airlines craft could not read!
Engineers pressed the matter through normal channels 
to the highest levels within both companies, but did 
not take it any further. Standard operating procedure at 
McDonnell Douglas and Convair was for engineers to 
defer to upper management, even though they were aware 
of serious design flaws. Were the engineers negligent? 
What about the three (obviously corrupted) inspectors 
who false certified that changes had been made? What 
responsibility rests with the ground crew members who 
actually closed and latched the door? Were these people 
negligent? 
This DC-10 bulk aft cargo door case is another 
example of unethical behaviour, where profit was above 
the concern for the human life. This is another illustration 
of a corporation’s mindset where the ethics and public 
good is of little concern unless it coincides with profits.
3. Importance of engineering ethics in 
contemporary society
Engineers often face the dilemma of loyalty to their 
company and employer versus their responsibility to 
the society and environment. The dilemma is whether a 
product presents an enormous hazard, whether engineers 
have a duty through their individual consciousness to 
make the problem public or whether they have to protect 
their company.
The question is, whether it is enough to act according 
to technical standards and canons. The answer is that 
they cannot cover the whole field of engineering design 
and responsibility. Engineers should not have a profit 
in mind in the first place. They always have to strive to 
design products that are, not only profitable, but also 
user-friendly and safe to a customer and environment 
[6]. They should take into account environmental aspects 
and safety of their design, i.e. possible pollution and 
necessity of product's recycling. When a new technology 
is introduced, its potential unintended consequences 
are unknown until decades later. Engineers should be 
committed to improving the environment to enhance 
the quality of life and to sustain the balance in nature. 
They shall hold the safety, health and welfare of the 
public as the paramount and shall strive to comply with 
the principles of sustainable development [7]. Engineers 
also have a responsibility to share technical knowledge 
and professional development, not only with younger 
members and colleagues but also with the public.
Engineers have obligations to future generations that 
could be harmed by irresponsible engineering activities, 
because it may take decades and generations for products 
and facilities to have adverse effects. Engineers who 
draw attention to problems against the wishes of their 
superiors are known as whistleblowers. They can 
expect that being a whistleblower will have serious 
Figure 10. Turkish Airlines DC-10 bulk aft cargo door [5]
Slika 10. Stražnja vrata za teret na avionu DC-10, avio-prijevoznika Turkish Airlines [5]
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consequences for their job, and perhaps for the rest of 
their career - even when the problem they are drawing 
attention to is real and important. But if an engineer’s 
superior, manager or colleague does not act to undo, curb 
or mitigate dangers of serious personal or social damage, 
it is necessary to offer honest criticism or even “blow the 
whistle”, so as to reduce the risk, to acknowledge and 
correct errors, violations or negative consequences as 
much as possible.
Engineers should always, in their engineering 
practice, ask themselves: Who will be affected by my 
decision? What general rules or principles underlie my 
decision? What are the implications of my decision for 
the Company and the public? What does my decision say 
about my moral values? (We all know people who say 
one thing and do another.) 
It is necessary here to point out how ancient people 
practically applied ethics, for example in the Hammurabi 
Code in Babylon, 1758 B.C.: “If a builder has built a 
house for a man and has not made his work sound, and the 
house he has built has fallen down and so caused the death 
of the householder, that builder shall be put to death. If it 
causes the death of the householder’s son, they shall put 
the builder’s son to death ...” Maybe Hammurabi Code 
seems cruel in our contemporary society, but the cruel 
truth is that, although great changes have taken place 
in human society, today’s human morality has declined 
drastically, ethical standards in society are very low and 
profits have become the sole motivation.
Engineers should not act using immoral and unethical 
rules and laws. They should not be bribed and corruptible. 
Engineers should always keep in mind the moral 
responsibility and obligations toward society as a whole. 
Their professional ethical standards have to transcend 
commonly accepted morality. An engineer of the high 
ethic behaviour should always be truthful, benevolent 
and tolerant. Ancient Chinese people summarized all 
these highest virtues in three Chinese words: Zhen (truth, 
truthfulness), Shan (kindness, benevolence, compassion) 
and Ren (endurance, forbearance, tolerance) [8].
Engineers of high ethical standards should not be 
involved in design of weapons for mass destruction i.e. 
chemical, nuclear and biological weapons. They also 
should not be involved in so called researches, which are 
in reality paid by various companies to advertise their 
products.
Engineering ethics is of the utmost importance for 
society as a whole. It is necessary to teach ethics in 
engineering education. Engineering ethics is one of 
the most important concepts engineering students must 
become familiar with. Students have to study the basis 
of ethics, i.e. philosophy, and history of ethics as well 
as contemporary engineering ethical canons and codes. 
Engineering ethics could be classified as microethics 
and macroethics. Microethics is concerned with ethical 
decision making by individuals and the internal relations 
of the engineering profession. Macroethics refers to 
the collective social responsibility of the engineering 
profession and to societal decisions about technology. 
Students should discuss the canons of ethics for 
engineers and general standards or principles by which 
the engineering profession is judged. Students have to 
recognize the importance of ethical and professional 
standards of conduct and the sociological and cultural 
context of the engineering profession [9].
If engineers will not respect ethics in their profession, 
it will directly affect the quality of life on Earth, i.e. 
bring more environmental pollution, affect welfare of 
humankind as well as the future of our children and 
the future of our unique home in the universe, our blue 
planet, the Earth.
4. Conclusion
Engineers have to be aware of ethics as they make 
choices during their professional practice and they 
should not think only about profit [10]. Therefore, a 
clear understanding and application of engineering 
ethics, especially in transport of people as well as various 
material goods (which includes environmental ethics) is 
needed like never before. It is of utmost importance to 
teach ethics in engineering education, because students 
have to recognize the importance of their ethical and 
professional standards of conduct. Engineers must 
perform under a standard of professional behavior that 
requires adherence to the highest principles of ethical 
conduct including honesty, impartiality, fairness, and 
equity, and do so in the absence of bribe and corruption 
[11]. They should also contribute to environmental 
protection and to sustaining the balance in nature. To be 
an engineer of a high quality one has to study, not only 
engineering, but also ethics and philosophy in order to 
understand relationships between man, nature and the 
universe and thus to become a humanist who respects, 
protects and welcomes all life on Earth.
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